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In a model with forward-looking behavior, we study disclosure policy when a central bank has private
information on the future state of the economy. We find that the effects of advance disclosure depend on the
presence of uncertainty about policy targets when the shock occurs. With uncertainty about policy targets,
disclosure is harmless to current outcomes, owing to the strong dependence of inflation expectations on
policy actions, which induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price stability. If the central bank's
targets are common knowledge, disclosure of future shocks impairs stabilization of current inflation and
output.
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1. Introduction
Over the past several years, many central banks (especially those engaging in inflation
targeting) have become more open about releasing their internal forecasts of the state of the
economy. In this case, almost all inflation targeting central banks publish their inflation forecasts
although some do not publish their output forecasts and nearly all central banks do not announce
projections of their interest rate policy path (see Mishkin, 2004 for a detailed discussion). Mishkin⁎ Corresponding author. Dusternbrooker Weg 120, 24105 Kiel, Germany. Tel.: +494318814273; fax: +4943185853.
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conduct monetary policy optimally with an appropriate focus on long-run objectives?”, and says
that “the answer might well be no.”
From the private sector's point of view, publication of central bank forecasts is welcome
because for some reasons, central bank forecasts outperform those of the private sector, an
indication perhaps of central bank's superior information about the future state of the economy,
including the state of shocks affecting economic activity. For instance, in their empirical analysis
on differences between commercial and Federal Reserve (Fed for short) forecasts, Romer and
Romer (2000) conclude that “the most important finding … is that the Federal Reserve appears to
possess information about the future state of the economy that is not known to market
participants.” (p.455), (emphasis ours).1
The theoretical literature has explored disclosure of forecasts in the context of a discretionary
monetary policy with private information about shocks to current inflation and output.2 The
results are usually mixed and depend on whether there is also additional asymmetry regarding the
central bank's preferences. Under a perfectly credible monetary policy, it turns out that
rationalizing disclosure of forecasts is usually difficult, at least theoretically (Gersbach, 2003;
Cukierman, 2001; Jensen, 2000). For instance, in a static setup that features a Lucas-type ag-
gregate supply function, Gersbach (2003) and Cukierman (2001) show that a central bank can
improve stabilization policy by withholding its private forecasts of current real shocks.
Cukierman (2001) finds a similar result using a simplified version of the backward-looking model
of Svensson (1997) that features time lags from the policy instrument to policy goals, and when
interest rate variability enters the loss function. Crucial here is that, in both transmission mech-
anisms, what matters is past expectations of current inflation and the public forms expectations
before policy decisions are taken.
When there are concerns about the central bank's credibility and private sector expectations
respond to central bank actions, the formation of private sector expectations plays a crucial role in
determining equilibrium outcomes. Geraats (2001) argues that uncertainty about the inflation
target can give rise to credibility concerns. In a two-period framework, Geraats shows that, if the
public uses monetary policy actions to infer the unobserved inflation target, there is an incentive
for the central bank to invest in reputation in the first period in order to have more flexibility to
react to shocks in the second period. This incentive is stronger the more the public knows about
current period shocks that the central bank is responding to.3
However, in a two-period New-Keynesian framework that features forward-looking
expectations, Jensen (2000) shows how releasing forecasts of current period shocks distorts
stabilization policy, even though it solves the credibility problem arising from overambitious
(unobserved) output target. Like Geraats, Jensen assumes that the public observes central bank1 In the case of the Federal Reserve, Romer and Romer (2000) discuss some of the reasons for higher quality forecasts,
including inside information about future monetary policy, access to official and unofficial data, and enormous devotion
of resources.
2 In the terminology of Geraats (2001), the release of internal forecasts is part of what she calls economic transparency.
She discusses several aspects of transparency including political (formal goals, numerical targets), economic (data,
models, forecasts), operational (control errors, transmission shocks), procedural (minutes of meeting, voting), and policy
(statements, inclination).
3 In a cross-section study using 87 countries Chortareas et al. (2002) find that publication of forecasts reduces average
inflation. Geraats and Eijffinger (2004) use time-series data on several aspects of transparency for nine major central
banks, based on an index of transparency constructed by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), and conclude that higher
transparency is associated with lower short-term as well as long-term interest rates, thus lending support to the positive
reputation effects of releasing forecasts, as was argued in Geraats (2001).
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current shocks, inflation expectations become extremely sensitive to the central bank's current
action. But, here comes the difference, in order to stabilize inflation expectations, policy tilts heavily
toward inflation stabilization,making current output very volatile. In that case, transparency could be
undesirable for a central banker who enjoys good initial reputation.
This paper considers disclosure policy about central bank forecasts and, unlike the previous
literature, analyzes the impact of forecasts of future shocks, as these forecasts are of interest when
inflation expectations are forward-looking. The model used to analyze future shocks is based on
the now familiar New-Keynesian model (see e.g., Clarida et al., 1999; King, 2000; McCallum and
Nelson, 2000), which has forward-looking inflation expectations influencing current period
outcomes. In this case, given the central bank's policy, a higher variability of inflation expec-
tations (which are conditional on forecasts of future shocks) means corresponding higher
variability of current inflation. This makes disclosure policy regarding forecasts of future shocks
an interesting issue to study.
We find that the effects of advance disclosure of forecasts of future shocks depends on the
presence of uncertainty about the central bank's preference. In line with previous studies, when
there is no credibility problem and/or the central bank's preference is common knowledge,
disclosure of future shocks impairs stabilization of current inflation and output. On the other
hand, when there is uncertainty about the central bank's future preference shock, advance dis-
closure of future cost-push shocks is harmless to current inflation and output. The reason lies in
the strong dependence of one-period-ahead private sector inflation forecasts on central bank
actions, which induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price stability. Another
implication of the paper is that when withholding forecasts of future shocks, these forecasts may
not be revealed to the public by current policy actions, as the central bank prefers to stabilize the
effects of private sector forecasts on current inflation.
In Section 3, we present a simple benchmark case where the central bank has full credibility
and its preferences are common knowledge. In such an environment, the central bank prefers not
to release information on future shocks as long as it has other goals besides price stability. With
multiple goals, the central bank would like to spread the effects of adverse supply shocks on
inflation and output gap, but knowing this, expected movements in future supply shocks make
private sector inflation expectations to be more volatile. This effect passes to current prices
through expectations of future inflation. Thus, it may be better from the perspective of the central
bank not to disclose information until the private sector sets inflation expectations. This ensures
that public expectations of future shocks are less volatile than when information about future
shocks is available.
The benchmark case is then modified in two ways. First, instead of discretionary policy, the
central bank is assumed to commit credibly to some state contingent rule (Section 4). This
modification does not, however, change the result found under the benchmark case. Second, we
introduce uncertainty on the part of the public regarding the central bank's preferences, which
gives rise to reputation considerations (Section 5).4 The relevance of shifts in preferences depends
on whether such uncertainty is directly resolved or via signaling of policy actions. It turns out that
if shifts in the central bank targets have to be inferred indirectly from future central bank actions,
disclosing information regarding future shocks can be harmless. Concluding remarks are given in
Section 6.4 Gersbach (2003) also concludes by emphasizing the significance of two-sided uncertainty (on preferences and
knowledge), which would allow one to make more precise statements about the disclosure policies.
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As we indicated in the introduction, the New-Keynesian view of the macroeconomy gives a
prominent role to private sector expectations of future inflation in the determination of current
inflation and output. A detailed description of the workhorse model can be found, for example, in
Clarida et al. (1999) and King (2000).
Important for our analysis is the forward-looking Phillips equation determines inflation given
by:
pt ¼ bEpt ptþ1 þ kxt þ ut ð1Þ
where πt is the rate of inflation, xt is the output gap, and ut is a zero-mean i.i.d (cost-push) shock
to inflation (ut∼N(0, σu2) for all t), a specification which is commonly used in the transparency
literature.5 The parameters β and λ satisfy 0bβb1 and λN0. The term Et
pπt+1 stands for private
sector (PS) expectations of next period's inflation conditional on available information at time t.
Thus inflation depends on forward-looking PS expectations, the output gap and inflation shock.
When prices are sticky, meaning that not all firms can reset their prices in every period,
expectations about future prices (and therefore inflation) play an important role in determining the
price level. It is the link between current inflation and expectations of future inflation that
differentiates the New-Keynesian Phillips curve from the Lucas-type Phillips curve where past
expectations of current inflation are important.
Likewise the dynamics of output demand is governed by a simplified version of the so called
intertemporal IS equation:
xt ¼ −/ðit−Ept ptþ1Þ þ mt ð2Þ
where it is the nominal interest rate and vt is an i.i.d shock to aggregate demand. The parameter ϕ
satisfies ϕN0.
The central bank (CB) chooses a sequence of short-term nominal interest rates so as to
minimize the expected value of current and future losses arising from variability in inflation and
output:
E0
Xl
t¼0
btLt ð3Þ
where the period-t loss function is typically given by:6
Lt ¼ p2t þ ax2t ð4Þ
with α denoting the weight the CB places on output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization.
For simplicity the target rate of inflation is normalized to zero. Moreover, in Section 3, the CB is5 The recent literature on discretion and commitment in a New-Keynesian framework sometimes assumes an i.i.d
specification (for instance, Woodford, 1999b). More generally, one may assume ut to be serially correlated without
changing our main qualitative results. All that is needed for our analysis is that the central bank has a superior signal
about ut+1 than is available to the private sector.
6 The quadratic loss function Eq. (4) is commonly used in monetary policy analyses. Using an optimizing micro-
founded model, Woodford (1999b) has shown that Eq. (4) represents a second-order approximation to the negative of the
utility of a representative household . This is the reason why the discount factor β (also present in the Phillips curve) is
the same as the discount factor in the intertemporal utility function of the representative household. This correspondence,
however, is not consequential for our analysis.
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abstract from principal-agent problems and assume the CB's loss function reflects social losses.
For β→1, one can scale the loss function Eq. (3) by (1−β), which can then be approximated
by the unconditional expected value of period t loss (4) (see e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson,
2002):
ð1−bÞE0
Xl
t¼0
btLtcEðLtÞ ¼ r2p þ ar2x ð5Þ
where σπ
2 and σx
2 are, respectively, the unconditional variances of inflation and output gap. We
will use this relationship in evaluating the expected losses arising from the regimes of
transparency and non-transparency.7
3. Observable CB preferences and disclosure policy
The CB is assumed to have a more accurate forecast of the cost-push shock ut+1 so that the CB
can track its development better than the PS. For simplicity, the CB has perfect information about
the shocks while the PS receives a noisy signal, st, of the shock. This assumption that the CB has
full knowledge of ut+1 is made only for convenience and is innocuous to the main message of the
paper. All we need is for the CB to have a better judgement about possible future movements in
the aggregate cost-push shocks.8
Except for information asymmetry regarding future shocks, there is common knowledge of the
CB's loss function, including the targets for inflation and output and the preference parameter α.
In this section, we abstract from considerations of inflation bias and assume that the CB targets the
equilibrium level of output, an assumption which is not unrealistic given the widely accepted
assertions about the prestige of major CBs.9 The effects of uncertainty about CB targets and
credibility issues are discussed in Section 4.
Notice from the Phillips curve that contrary to ut, which affects πt directly, ut+1 matters for
period t outcomes and policy choices only in so far as it affects price setting firm's inflation
expectations. So the question basically boils down to whether firm's expectations are more or less
variable in response to new information disclosed by the central bank.10
The analysis here focuses on the expectation channel, that is, on how communication of the
central bank's judgment of future events affects current inflation because of changes in currently7 It is common in the literature to use the unconditional variance as the policy criterion. See e.g., McCallum and Nelson
(2000) and the references therein.
8 cf. Footnote 5.
9 For some forceful arguments against the literature on inflationary bias, see McCallum (1995), Blinder (1998). In the
case of the Fed, Bernanke (2003), Romer and Romer (2000) discuss the reputation that the Fed has gained over the past
two decades.
10 We thank one of our referees for pointing us to a general setup where ut+1 can also have an explicit role for period t
outcomes, a task that we plan to take up in the future. Here, we also note that, while those firms which can reset their
prices benefit from information about upcoming cost-push shocks, since other firms have sticky prices, in aggregate
disclosure of forecasts leads to relative price dispersion, which leads to inefficient allocation of sectoral output and
consumption (Woodford (2003), p.400-401 and cf. Footnote 6). That is why a stable inflation rate (a function of stable
expectations) is desirable in the New-Keynesian model used here.While in this benchmark case, more information
disclosure makes expectations respond to the news, which in turn leads to more variability in actual inflation, in general
one can show that the effect of expectations on current variables can differ, for example owing to control lags in the
transmission of policy.
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targets. One might argue that the disclosure regime about forecasts is inseparable to the credibility
of the central bank's announced targets for inflation and output. The central bank's disclosure
policy regarding its forecasts may be related to the fact that it wants to have flexibility to stabilize
fluctuations in the economy.
3.1. Disclosure policy under discretion
Since the transparency regime is first announced, PS expectations will be conditional on the
announced regime and the anticipated behavior of the CB. If ut+1 is communicated to the public,
inflation expectations will be conditional on ut+1. Thus, under full transparency, the PS is not
involved in signal extraction. On the other hand, if the CB does not communicate, the PS is
assumed to receive a noisy signal, st, about ut+1:
11
st ¼ utþ1 þ et ð6Þ
where εt∼N(0,σε2) for all t. εt represents the noise that contaminates the signal and is independent
of ut+1. Optimal signal extraction by the PS implies that Et
put+1=kst, where 0bk≡σu2 / (σu2 +σε2)b
1. Under full disclosure, the signal is useless since the PS has perfect information about ut+1.
It is important, for future reference, to realize the fact that the unconditional variance of kst,
given by k 2σs
2, is less than σu
2:
k2r2s ¼ kr2ubr2u ð7Þ
In other words, the variance of PS expectations of the shock based on the signal is less than
what it would be if there was full information about the shock. This is the essence in which the CB
might have an incentive not to reveal its private information about the upcoming shock.
We proceed by deriving the equilibrium outcomes under each regime and then compare the
resulting losses from each regime. Here, the CB first decides about whether or not to reveal its
private information and then the game is played where PS expectations are formed and the CB
chooses policy taking PS expectations as given (see Cukierman, 2001 for a similar setup with
Lucas-type transmission mechanism). The timing in period t is:
• ut realizes and is commonly known.
• The CB announces the disclosure regime. Under transparency, the CB reveals ut+1 truthfully.
12
• Et
pπt+1 is formed conditional on the disclosure regime and in anticipation of the optimal policy
rule of the CB.
• Given Et
pπt+1, the CB chooses the pair {xt, πt} so as to minimize its loss function subject to the
Phillips equation.1311 As a limiting case, one could assume the PS to be completely uninformed about the cost-push shock by setting
σε
2→∞.
12 This is commonly assumed in the transparency literature since the focus of the analysis is usually on whether or not a
transparent regime dominates a non-transparent one.
13 For convenience the problem is solved in two steps. First, one solves for the optimal paths of inflation and output
subject to Eq. (1). Then, the optimal instrument path for the nominal rate can be inferred from the IS Eq. (2). See e.g.,
Clarida et al. (1999).
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that in each period the CB minimizes Eq. (4) given PS expectations (the term Et
pπt+1 in the
Phillips Eq. (1) is treated as a fixed parameter).14 Since the CB takes PS expectations as given, the
following optimality condition holds under each regime of transparency:
xt ¼ − ka pt ð8Þ
According to Eq. (8), in each period, the CB contracts (expands) current output in response
to a higher (lower) rate of current inflation. In essence, the CB is reacting to any variable that
directly or indirectly affects current inflation. For example if for some reasons Et
pπt+1
increases by 1%, πt goes up by βEt
pπt+1, given the level of xt. But, the optimality rule ensures
that this situation does not materialize because the CB reduces xt to ease the burden on πt.
15
The above optimality condition is related to what Lars Svensson calls a “specific targeting
rule”, a rule expressed in terms of the goal variables (inflation and output), and derived from a
well-defined objective function.16 It should be emphasized that the targeting rule holds for all
possible levels of PS expectations as perceived by the CB. The next step is to determine PS
inflation expectations. Since the PS correctly anticipates the targeting rule of the CB, it knows
that the dynamics of inflation is determined by Eqs. (8) and (1). Substituting Eq. (8) in Eq. (1)
gives:
pt ¼ ab
aþ k2 E
p
t ptþ1 þ
a
aþ k2 ut ð9Þ
Eq. (9) shows that the evolution of actual inflation depends on currently held PS expectations
about future inflation and on the current realization of the exogenous shock ut. In this setting,
Et
pπt+1 is ultimately determined by Et
put+1. Thus, the role of forecasts of the shocks is clear, and
any information that improves the PS's forecast accuracy with respect to ut+1 is valuable. The
mechanism by which any private information about forecasts of future shocks affect current
inflation outcomes can be shown as follows:
Disclosing utþ1YE
p
t ptþ1 ¼ f ðutþ1ÞYpt ¼ gðutþ1Þ
Withholding utþ1YE
p
t ptþ1 ¼ f ðstÞYpt ¼ gðstÞ
With this idea in mind, we can now solve the model for Et
pπt+1 and derive the rational
expectations equilibrium. We first derive equilibrium inflation and output under a non-transparent
regime where knowledge of ut+1 is withheld by the CB.14 Thus, the timing of events is such that the CB chooses its interest rate policy for the current period after observing
PS inflation expectations, and any advance information about current and next period shocks; see e.g., Cukierman
(2001).
15 This means that it should increases more than one-to-one with Et
pπt+1.
16 It differs from an “instrument rule” that describes a reaction function for the nominal rate of interest (the instrument of
monetary policy). See e.g., Svensson (2003).
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Under a non-transparent regime, the relevant state variables are ut and st. Using the commonly
used method of undetermined coefficients,17 we start from Eq. (9) and guess the following
solution for inflation:
pt ¼ h1ut þ h2st ¼ h1ut þ h2ðutþ1 þ etÞ ð10Þ
where the coefficient are yet to be determined. Without full disclosure of ut+1, the PS resorts to its
signal in forming expectations of ut+1:
Ept ptþ1 ¼ h1Ept utþ1 ¼ h1kst ð11Þ
Next, replace Eq. (11) in Eq. (9) to get the following equilibrium level of inflation:
pt ¼ ab
aþ k2 h1kst þ
a
aþ k2 ut ð12Þ
Consistency between Eq. (12) and the guessed form Eq. (10) implies that:
pt ¼ h⁎1 ut þ h⁎2 st ð13Þ
where
h⁎1 ¼
a
aþ k2 and h
⁎
2 ¼ bkh⁎21
To get the solution for xt, substitute Eq. (13) into Eq. (8):
xt ¼ − ka ðh
⁎
1 ut þ h⁎2 stÞ ð14Þ
We can now compare the resulting inflation expectations of the two parties:
Ect ptþ1 ¼ h⁎1 utþ1
Ept ptþ1 ¼ h⁎1 kst ¼ h⁎1 kðutþ1 þ etÞ ð15Þ
Taking note of Eq. (7), inflation expectations of the PS have less variability compared to those
of the CB.
3.1.2. Equilibrium under a transparent regime
Consider the case of transparency about ut+1, where both parties have identical information
sets. We note that under full disclosure, the conjectured solution takes the form:
pt ¼ h1ut þ h2utþ1 ð16Þ
where again the coefficients will be determined later. With full disclosure of ut+1, rational
expectations imply that:
Ept ptþ1 ¼ h1Ept utþ1 ¼ h1utþ1 ð17Þ17 McCallum (1983) emphasizes on solving the model using only the fundamentals of the economy (in this case ut and
st), avoiding bubble solutions. McCallum calls this the Minimal State Variables (MSV) method.
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pt ¼ ab
aþ k2 h1utþ1 þ
a
aþ k2 ut ð18Þ
which looks similar to its counterpart under a non-transparent regime, except that now ut+1
replaces kst. For Eq. (16) to be true it must be that:
pt ¼
∼
h1ut þ
∼
h2utþ1 ð19Þ
where
∼h1 ¼ h⁎1 and ∼h2 ¼ bh⁎21
Then, the solution for xt follows immediately:
xt ¼ − ka ð
∼h1ut þ ∼h2utþ1Þ ð20Þ
We can see that current inflation and output levels are affected not only by current period
shocks, but also by next period shocks that are released to the public. Thus releasing information
regarding ut+1 makes current inflation and output more volatile. To show this formally using the
loss function, we evaluate the unconditional variance Eq. (5) using the equilibrium levels of
inflation and output under each regime.18 Let E(Lt
T) and E(Lt
NT) denote, respectively, the expected
losses under the transparent and non-transparent regimes. Using Eqs. (9) and (14) in Eq. (5) and
taking note of Eqs. (6) and (7):
EðLNTt Þ ¼ 1þ
k2
a
 
ðh⁎21 þ kh⁎22 Þr2u ð21Þ
Analogously, using Eqs. (19) and (20) in Eq. (5) and simplifying:
EðLTt Þ ¼ 1þ
k2
a
 
ðh⁎21 þ h⁎22 Þr2u ð22Þ
Since 0bkb1, we have E(Lt
NT)≤E(LtT).19
Summarizing, the solutions for inflation and output depend on the degree of transparency
about ut+1. The main culprit for the increased volatility under transparency is the variation in PS
inflation expectations. Thus it is optimal from the CB's point of view that the PS expects inflation
in the next period be as less volatile as possible, although the reality is to the contrary. The CB
knows the current error in PS forecasts but is not willing to disclose any information before period
t+1 arrives or, equivalently, before PS expectations are set and policy actions taken.18 In equilibrium, PS and CB inflation expectations are Et
pπt+1=E
c
tπt+1=θ1⁎ ut+1, which differs from the case of secrecy
as far as PS expectations are concerned.
19 This result also holds when the CB's objective includes interest rate stabilization as an additional goal (see
Cukierman, 2001; Goodhart, 1998; Woodford, 1999a, among others, for discussions of interest rate stabilization).
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As it was indicated in the introduction, the transparency literature focuses on disclosure of
current shocks. An implication of this is that current policy choices may partly reveal to the public
the CB's private information. In the New-Keynesian framework with private information on
future shocks, current period action does not give a signal of the CB's private information for two
reasons. First, as the Phillips and IS equations show, optimal policy reacts to PS expectations of
inflation and output, which under secrecy do not depend on the CB's information about ut+1.
Second, unlike ut, which directly affects current inflation irrespective of PS expectations, the CB
does not need to react to ut+1. As can be seen from the case of secrecy (see Eqs. (18) and (14)), the
information advantage of the CB with respect to ut+1 is not revealed even ex post. Intuitively,
under no disclosure policy, the PS does not know the realization of ut+1, although it knows that the
CB has that information. The best it can do is therefore to set expectations based on its signals.
To see the implications for the nominal interest rate of not releasing the CB forecasts of ut+1,
use the equilibrium solution for output and PS expectations in the IS equation and solve for the
interest rate rule that implements optimal policy. Ignoring the demand shock vt for simplicity
20
it ¼ 1þ bkh
⁎
1
a/
 !
h⁎1 kst þ
kh⁎1
a/
ut
Thus, in equilibrium, the rate of interest ultimately responds to current period shocks and PS
signal of next period shocks. Even if the CB announces it, the PS cannot infer the CB's private
information by observing it. This is true even if the PS knows the CB's loss function, including
the targets for inflation and output and the relative weight on output stabilization. In this respect,
Svensson (2003) argues that the best way to make the CB's forecasts observable to the public is
by revealing the CB's model, information, assumptions and judgments. In previous studies on
transparency of current period shocks, full knowledge of the loss function enables the PS to infer
ex post the CB's private information about these shocks. In our case, revelation of the CB's loss
function is not sufficient for inferring the CB's private information about future shocks because
the CB knows that future shocks affect current inflation only via PS expectations.21
3.3. Disclosure policy under limited commitment
The classic theory of time-inconsistency in monetary policy rationalizes the high inflation
period of the 1970s by the discretionary behavior of CBs. The term “inflation bias” was coined to
underscore the implication of the theory that, absent rule-based monetary policy, equilibrium
inflation turns out to be above the socially optimal (target) level because of the temptation of
monetary authorities (due to an overambitious output or employment target) to renege on their
plans once PS expectations are set. With forward-looking expectations in the New-Keynesian
view of the macroeconomy, we may have not only an inflation bias, but also a “stabilization bias”
as a result of discretionary policy (Clarida et al., 1999).22 Even without the inflation bias problem,
monetary authorities would like the PS to believe that policy will be strongly anti-inflationary in20 Observe that the demand shock does not give rise to a tradeoff in stabilizing inflation and output since the implied
adjustment in interest rates to changes in demand shock moves output and inflation in the same direction. That is why in
equilibrium, output and inflation are independent of the demand shock.
21 A potential limitation of this argument is that the CB is assumed to observe PS expectations without error.
22 This is in the sense of output being stabilized at the expense of inflation in the presence of cost-push shocks.
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but once PS inflation expectations are manipulated this way, the authorities will have an incentive
(if they are free to do so) not to stabilize inflation strongly, contrary to their plans. Knowing this
fact, the PS will set inflation expectations such that the discretionary equilibrium is the only result.
If the CB cannot credibly commit to keeping inflation variability low in the future there by
losing power to anchor inflation expectations, then policy ends up being discretionary, in effect
minimizing current period's loss. The crucial observation we made in the case of discretionary
policy is that the CB would like to see that fluctuations in PS inflation expectations are
minimized. In this situation the CB will do anything that makes inflation expectations less
variable. If it has private information about future developments of the economy, it will refrain
from disclosing those information to the public, as we have shown in the case of cost-push shocks.
This section shows that the undesirable property of transparency about future shocks is not
unique to discretionary policy. Even if the CB was to follow a rule-based policy, it would still favor
secrecy as long as the CB's objective function includes output stabilization. The reason lies on the
fact that under transparency, the tradeoff between inflation and output stabilization worsens as a
result of the PS incorporating future shocks in its expectations irrespective of the CB's commitment.
3.3.1. Commitment for a transparent CB
A simple way to appreciate the gains from some form of commitment would be to consider a
transparent regime about the shock ut+1. The question is then, can the CB improve stabilization
policy if it has the ability to commit to a given policy rule? The answer is, yes. To make it specific,
suppose the CB can commit credibly to a simple policy rule that takes the same form as Eq. (20).
Although this is a sort of limited commitment, as we have constrained the CB to follow a rule that
has a particular form, it serves to show the benefits from commitment. The idea is to see if a
transparent CB can lower its expected losses by committing to a simple rule within the same class
of rules derived under discretion. Thus consider a commitment to the following rule
xt ¼ −Aut−Butþ1 ð23Þ
where the weights A and B are to be chosen optimally by the CB. Then from Eq. (23) (and see
Appendix) PS expectations for output and inflation follow:
Ept xtþ1 ¼ −Autþ1
Ept ptþ1 ¼ ð1−kAÞutþ1
These expressions show clearly that the CB's choice of a particular value for A will directly
affect PS inflation and output expectations, and via the Phillips and IS equations, current inflation
and output. Using the expression for Et
pπt+1 in the Phillips Eq. (1) the reduced form expression for
inflation, under commitment to the simple rule, will be:
pt ¼ ð1−kAÞut þ ðbð1−kAÞ−kBÞutþ1 ð24Þ
Given the choices of the values for the feedback parameters A and B, the dynamics of output
and inflation is governed by Eqs. (23) and (24). We can now express the expected loss as a
function of the parameters A and B:
EðLTt Þ ¼ ðð1−kAÞ2 þ aA2 þ ðbð1−kAÞ−kBÞ2 þ aB2Þr2u ð25Þ
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A⁎ ¼ k½k
2 þ að1þ b2Þ
ak2b2 þ ðaþ k2Þ2 ¼ 1þ
a2b2
ðaþ k2Þ2 þ ab2k2
 !
k
aþ k2
B⁎ ¼ abk
ak2b2 þ ðaþ k2Þ2
The first observation is that both of these coefficients differ from their counterparts under
discretion with transparency (see Eq. (20)), showing the CB could improve up on the discretionary
equilibrium by following a simple state-contingent rule that takes the same form as the discretionary
solution but with different weights placed on the current versus forecasted shocks. Moreover, as
long as αN0, that is the CB cares about output stabilization, A⁎ is larger than its corresponding
coefficient while B⁎ is smaller than its corresponding coefficient. This means that under
commitment to the simple target rule Eq. (23) policy responds more aggressively to ut but less
aggressively to ut+1. The intuition for this result is that with partial commitment, a more aggressive
policy in terms of contracting aggregate demand in reaction to current shocks leads the PS to expect
aggressive policy in the next period, thus lowering their inflation expectations. This in turn dampens
the effect of future shocks on current inflation. Thus, the CB can afford to be less aggressive with
respect to future shocks because the PS does part of the job by adjusting its expectations. Knowing
the value of A⁎, the reduced-form of PS inflation expectations is:
Ept ptþ1 ¼
Ha
aþ k2 utþ1; Hu1−
ab2k2
ab2k2 þ ðaþ k2Þ2
Since H satisfies 0bHb1, PS inflation expectations respond less strongly to future shocks than
is the case under discretion. This outcome arises from the CB's commitment to react more strongly
to current shocks. If this commitment is credible, the PS expects a strong reaction to next period
shocks when the time arrives. This in turn lowers inflation expectations and current inflation.
For equilibrium inflation we have:
pt ¼ aðaþ k2Þ þ ðaþ k2Þ−1ab2k2 ut þ
a2b
ðaþ k2Þ2 þ ab2k2 utþ1 ð26Þ
Note that, compared to discretion, a policy of limited commitment results in less variability in
the dynamics of inflation (compare Eqs. (19) and (26)). This behavior contrasts with output,
which responds more strongly ut but less strongly to ut+1. Although this might make one conclude
that the net effect of limited commitment on CB loss function is not clear, it should be obvious that
limited commitment improves welfare. Why else would the CB choose different coefficients
under limited commitment although the simple rule Eq. (23) falls under the class of rules derived
from the discretionary solution? For the sake of completeness, however, we compare the expected
losses in both regimes. Let d denote discretion and c commitment. Then:
EðLT ; jt Þ ¼ QT ; jr2u; j ¼ d; c:
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QT ;cu
a2ð1þ b2Þ þ ak2
ðaþ k2Þ2 þ ab2k2 ; QT ;du
aða2b2 þ ðaþ k2Þ2Þ
ðaþ k2Þ3
Next, evaluating the ratio QT,d /QT,c:
QT ;d
QT ;c
¼ 1þ a
3b4k2
ðað1þ b2Þ þ k2Þðaþ k2Þ3 N1
3.3.2. The gains from secrecy under limited commitment
What we have shown so far is that conditional on releasing internal forecasts of ut+1 to the
public, the CB is able to improve macroeconomic outcomes by credibly committing to a simple
rule that reacts to these shocks. But, can the CB do even better by withholding information about
ut+1 and committing to a simpler rule? We can show that this is indeed optimal. The CB will gain
by withholding information on ut+1 and simply announcing the following policy rule:
xt ¼ −Aut ð27Þ
lies in the fact that PS inflation expectations are always zero because of the policy of secrecy by the
CB, it is fairly easy to show that the CB's incentives do not change by this form of change in policy
regime.
To see this, forward Eq. (27) one period and take PS expectations of xt+1:
Ept xtþ1 ¼ −AEpt utþ1 ¼ −Akst
Moreover, PS inflation expectations are given by (see Appendix):
Ept ptþ1 ¼ ð1−kAÞEpt utþ1 ¼ ð1−kAÞkst
Given PS expectations of inflation and output and the simple rule Eq. (27) followed by the CB,
inflation will take the form:
pt ¼ ð1−kAÞðbkst þ utÞ
Expressing the expected loss as a function of A:
EðLNTt Þ ¼ ½ð1þ b2kÞð1−kAÞ2 þ aA2r2u ð28Þ
and minimizing Eq. (28) with respect to A gives the optimal value, Ã=λ / [(1+β2k)−1 α+λ2]. The
CB prefers this outcome to the policy of disclosing ut+1 shown in the previous section. Thus if the
CB is ever to commit to a simple rule, it will choose not to respond to ut+1 and at the same time not
be transparent about its realization.
It is possible to generalize the commitment case by considering the unconstrained (full)
commitment solution, where the optimal policy rule under commitment is not constrained to take
the functional form under limited commitment. In order to exploit forward-looking expectations,
the CB commits to a path for current and future levels of inflation and the output gap that
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targeting rule is (see e.g., Clarida et al., 1999 for details):
xt ¼ xt−1− ka pt
The above rule looks similar to the targeting rule under discretion, except that now there is an
additional term, the lagged output gap, xt−1, indicating history dependence in policy setting, which
implies that future decisions will depend on current decisions. Such a commitment enables the CB to
anchor PS inflation expectations more effectively.23 Here, xt−1 enters as an additional state variable
when solving the above history-dependent targeting rule and the Phillips curve for the rational
expectations equilibrium.As far as forward-looking inflations expectationsmatter, the desirability of
withholding the CB's advance information about ut+1 holds true also when the CB has full
commitment.24
4. Unobserved CB preferences, credibility and signaling
This section modifies the analysis in Section 3 in two ways. First, as in Faust and Svensson
(2001) and Jensen (2000), the model includes unobserved shifts in the CB's output target. This
introduces an inflation bias as the output target can differ from the natural rate, assumed to be
zero. In addition, the timing of events is such that the CB chooses its policy before PS inflation
expectations are set. In principle, this implies that the PS can infer in part the output target from
CB actions.
As will be shown below, the relevance of disclosing forecasts of future shocks is not clear cut
and depends on specific assumptions about the unobserved output target. Specifically, the CB is
better off by withholding its private information about future shocks if the shift in output target is
observed with a one period lag. On the other hand if the output target is not revealed in subsequent
periods, disclosing information is inconsequential for period-t outcomes.
4.1. A three-period model
Suppose in period t the CB has private information about the supply shock ut+1 while ut is
common knowledge. Somewhat similar to Jensen, (2000), the game has three periods, with the
Phillips equation for period t given by (without loss of generality, we ignore discounting and set
β=1):
pt ¼ Ept ptþ1 þ kxt þ ut t ¼ 1; 2; 3 u3 ¼ 0
In Jensen (2000), u1 is assumed to be private information of the CB while (implicitly) u2 is
unknown as of period 1; its value is set to zero as period 2 is interpreted to be the long-run.25 Since
we are interested in analyzing future shocks, suppose instead that in period 1, u1 is common
knowledge while u2 is the CB's private information. In Period 3, the economy reaches a steady
state, with u3=0, as period 3 represents the long-run.24 It is also interesting to see that when α=λ the above rule is identical to a rule that is derived from a discretionary
policy that targets the nominal income growth (for a thorough discussion of nominal income targeting, see Hall and
Mankiw (1994)).
25 Thus, in Jensen's model only the play in period 1 is relevant for the final outcomes.
23 History dependence is closely related to the notion of ‘timeless perspective’ first discussed in Woodford (1999a).
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U ¼ L1 þ L2 þ L3
Lt ¼ p2t þ aðxt−x⁎t Þ2 t ¼ 1; 2; 3
where xt⁎∼N(0,σ2), x1⁎=0, x2⁎=x⁎, and x3⁎=x2⁎. These assumptions closely follow (Jensen, 2000).
The sequence of events and actions is as follows:
• Period 1: u1 realizes→CB knows u2 while PS gets a signal s1→CB chooses x1→E1
pπ2
formed→π1 determined
• Period 2: x2⁎ and u2 realize; PS knows u2→CB chooses x2→E2
pπ3 formed→π2 determined
• Period 3 (full information steady state): PS observes x⁎, CB chooses x3→π3 determined
Since the outcomes of the play in period 2 is crucial, we allow a permanent shock to the output
target in that period and assume this to be private information of the CB, while the PS observes the
shock with one period lag (that is, in period 3). To motivate our analysis, shifts in the output target
of the CB may represent political pressures on the CB or changes in the composition of the
decision making committee of the CB.26 Thus in periods 2, the PS faces uncertainty about the
preference shock and in period 1 about u2.
Following Jensen (2000), monetary policy is discretionary; the model is thus solved
backwards starting from period 3. Since the policy horizon is finite and expectations are forward-
looking, a terminal condition for inflation expectations must be assumed for period 3 (see Jensen,
2000 in this regard). As noted above, the economy stays in a full information steady state from
period 3 onwards, implying π3=π4, E3
pπ4=π4 and x3=0. Consistent with this idea, we set
Ep3p4 ¼ akx⁎3 ¼
a
k
x⁎, which will be confirmed below.27
Then the CB chooses x3 in order to minimize period 3 loss:
a
k
x⁎ þ kx3
 2
þaðx3−x⁎Þ2
The optimal solution is x3=0, which implies that:
p3 ¼ ak x
⁎ ð29Þ
These are the steady state values for output and inflation, featuring an inflation bias as long as
x⁎N0. Note also that since Eq. (29) implies Ep3p4 ¼ ak x
⁎, the conjecture for PS expectations is
confirmed.
Next consider period 2. As we show below, it turns out that the effects of disclosing u2 in
period 1 depend on how the game is played in period 2. We consider alternative scenarios based26 See e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Faust and Svensson (2001), Jensen (2000) for similar interpretations to the
preference shock.
27 As Jensen rightly points out, the exact expression for the terminal condition is not that important for the choice of
disclosure policy made in period 1. This particular inflation expectations can also be derived from an infinite horizon
model with full information about the loss function of the CB.
45S. Eijffinger, M.F. Tesfaselassie / European Journal of Political Economy 23 (2007) 30–50on the PS's knowledge of x⁎ in period 2. In the first case, the PS directly observes the CB's output
target, and thus the CB's choice of x2 does not play a signaling role about the output target. In the
second case, the PS has to infer the output target from the CB's choice of x2, giving rise to the role
signaling and associated incentive effects. Thus the determination of E2
pπ3, which follows from
the solution for π3 in Eq. (29) is crucial.
Case 1. x⁎ is directly observed in period 2.
When x⁎ is common knowledge in period 2, E2
pπ3=αx⁎ /λ, which is independent of x2. Since
PS inflation expectations are identical in periods 2 and 3, the solution for x2 is similar to that in
period 3, except for the fact that u2 is not necessarily zero. Analogous to period 3, the solutions for
x2 and π2 are
28
x2 ¼ − k
aþ k2 u2
p2 ¼ ak x
⁎ þ a
aþ k2 u2 ð30Þ
An implication of Eq. (30) is that, in period 1 inflation expectations depend on the PS's
forecast of u2. From period 1's perspective both the CB and the PS expect x2⁎ to take its mean
value of zero. It follows that the value of E1
pπ2 depends on disclosure policy of the CB. Under full
disclosure of u2, E
p
1p2 ¼ aaþ k2u2, while E
p
1p2 ¼ aaþ k2ks1 if u2 is not disclosed in period 1 and
the PS has to depend on its noisy signal (see Section 3).29 Anticipating the reaction of the PS
expectations depends on disclosure policy, the CB chooses x1 such that it minimizes the period 1
loss function.
When withholding information on u2, the loss function is (assuming u1=0 for simplicity):
30
Ec1
a
aþ k2 ks1 þ kx1
 2
þax21
" #
The first order condition with respect to x1 gives:
x1 ¼ − akðaþ k2Þ2 ks1 ð31Þ
p1 ¼ a
aþ k2
 2
ks1 ð32Þ28 Then the CB chooses x2 in order to minimize period 2 loss, which is given by:
a
k
x⁎ þ kx2 þ u2
 2
þaðx2−x⁎Þ:
29 Note that the problem faced by the CB in period 1 is identical to the benchmark model with common knowledge of
the CB's preferences.
30 One may wonder if the PS could get a signal about u2 from the CB's choice of x1. This is not possible as the CB
would never react to u2 in period 1.
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pπ2:
x1 ¼ − akðaþ k2Þ2 u2 ð33Þ
p1 ¼ a
aþ k2
 2
u2 ð34Þ
which shows that, compared to Eqs. (31) and (32), inflation and output have more variability
under full disclosure (cf. Eq. (7)).
It is clear that communicating u2 to the PS in period 1 makes inflation and output more volatile.
This is in line with the result in the full information benchmark (Section 3). Thus preference shocks,
if observable by the public, do not change the basic message of the full information case without
preference shocks. We think that a more interesting case is when the CB's preference is not directly
revealed to the PS. This gives rise to incentive effects since in period 2 the CB takes into account the
dependence of PS expectations on the action taken by the CB.
Case 2. x⁎ is not directly observed in period 2
This time Eq. (29) implies that E2
pπ3=αE2
px⁎ /λ since the PS needs to forecast the value of x⁎.
Since the relevant state variables in period 2 are x⁎ and u2, conjecture the following form for x2:
x2 ¼ h2u2 þ hxx⁎ ð35Þ
where the coefficients are yet to be determined. Since in period 2 the PS observes x2 and u2, it can
make perfect inferences about x⁎ from a signal, s2, where:
s2ux2−h2u2 ¼ hxx⁎ ð36Þ
It is straightforward to see from Eq. (36) that PS expectations of x⁎ given the signal s2 is
E2
px⁎=Sxs2 where Sx≡1 /hx. Then E2pπ3=αSxs2 /λ, and the minimization problem for period 2 is
min
x2
Ec2
a
k
Sxs2 þ kx2 þ u2
 2
þaðx2−x⁎Þ2
 
which leads to the following first order condition:
0 ¼ Ec2
a
k
Sxs2 þ kx2 þ u2
  a
k
Sx þ k
 
þ aðx2−x⁎Þ
h 
Using the fact that E2
cs2=hx x⁎, x2 can be expressed as a function of u2 and x⁎. Then the
undetermined coefficients must satisfy
h2 ¼ − k
2 þ aSx
kðaþ k2 þ aSxÞ
hx ¼ ak
2
ak2 þ ðk2 þ aSxÞ2
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hx→0. It follows by definition that Sx→∞. This shows that PS expectations react very strongly to
the signal s2 (which is related one-to-one with CB action x2). This in turn forces the CB not to
respond to its preference shock x⁎. Next, the first equation gives the solution for h2:
h2 ¼ − 1k
Combining the above results, equilibrium output and inflation in period 2 are
x2 ¼ − 1k u2
p2 ¼ ak x
⁎ ð37Þ
The intuition for this result is as follows. The strong dependence of PS inflation expectations
on monetary policy (the output choices) forces the CB to care about its reputation. Thus, the fact
that expectations are now very sensitive to the policy action, x2, induces the CB not to acco-
mmodate the preference shock to its output target, x⁎.
An immediate implication of Eq. (37) is that disclosing CB forecasts of u2 prior to the
formation of inflation expectations in period 1 is harmless to period 1 outcomes of inflation
and output. Disclosing u2 in period 1 does not affect period 1 expectations of period 2's
inflation rate, since it is common knowledge that the CB would completely offset the effect of
u2 on π2.
The solutions for x1 and π1 in period 1 can now be derived. First Eq. (37) implies that E1
pπ2=
α(E1
px⁎) /λ=0. Next, the CB solves for the optimal level of x1 that minimizes:
ðkx1 þ u1Þ2 þ ax21
The equilibrium output and inflation in period 1 are:
x1 ¼ − k
aþ k2 u1 p1 ¼
a
aþ k2 u1 ð38Þ
where the CB optimally stabilizes period 1 shocks. Inflation expectations are firmly anchored at
zero due to the anticipated behavior of the CB, which is expected to stabilize period 2 inflation
completely under preference shocks. Thus communicating u2 to the PS in period 1 is
inconsequential to the CB's loss.
5. Summary and conclusion
Over the past several years, many CBs have increased their level of transparency with respect
to their forecasts on the state of the economy. However, the recent theory on transparency has not
settled the question about welfare gains from advance disclosure of CB forecasts. Existing
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shocks have direct impact on current economic variables, such as inflation and output, that a CB
is interested in stabilizing. Based on this notion of private information, a few empirical studies on
transparency lend support to the argument that disclosure of CB forecasts can enhance the
reputation and flexibility of monetary policy.
This paper explores the significance of private information on future shocks, as forecasts of
future shocks are crucial when inflation expectations are forward-looking. In a simple macro
model with forward-looking expectations, we study disclosure policy when a CB has private
information on future shocks. We find that the effects of advance disclosure of forecasts of future
shocks depend on the existence of CB preference uncertainty.
In line with previous studies, when there is no credibility problem and/or the CB's
preference is common knowledge, disclosure of future shocks impairs stabilization of current
inflation and output. On the other hand, when there is uncertainty about the CB's future
preference shock, advance disclosure of future shocks is harmless to current inflation and
output. The reason lies in the strong dependence of one-period-ahead PS inflation forecasts on
CB actions, which induces the CB to focus exclusively on price stability. Another implication
of the paper is that when withholding forecasts of future shocks, these forecasts may not be
revealed to the public by current policy actions, as the CB prefers to respond to PS forecasts.
Thus while current shocks may be revealed by current CB actions, this may not be true for
forecasts of future shocks. The result about the destabilizing effect of early disclosure of
forecasts goes through for some alternative specifications, as long as there is full information
regarding CB preferences. The results go through for a loss function that includes interest rate
stabilization objective, on top of inflation and output; or if the CB targets nominal income
growth, instead of inflation and output, as proposed by some economists. Moreover, whether
policy is conducted under discretion or some form of commitment is inconsequential to the
main result. Even though disclosing information seems counter-intuitive, as it improves the
accuracy of PS inflation forecast, the negative result on welfare (under a credible CB) is a
consequence of the CB having objectives other than price stability. With multiple
macroeconomic goals, releasing internal forecasts before the public have currently formed
expectations of future shocks, and thus future inflation, can actually impair overall stabilization
efforts.
Our conjecture is that the results also apply if we drop rational expectations and assume in line
with the learning literature that the PS and/or the CB adaptively learn about the structure of the
economy, adjusting their forecasts with the arrival of new data. All that is needed for our results is
that the CB has superior information about future supply shocks.
Obviously, there are some limitations of our analysis, limitations that are also shared by the
literature on disclosure policy of CB forecasts. First, the CB is assumed to observe PS
expectations without error. Introducing observation errors would put the CB at a disadvantage,
and with very large errors, the CB may even be forced to be transparent about its private
information. Second, there is no strategic manipulation of expectations by the PS, although it
knows that the CB is responding to PS expectations. If the PS knows that the CB reacts to PS
expectations, there is possible strategic behavior. Third, on the part of the CB there could be a
manipulate private information and truthful revelation may not be feasible. As Romer and Romer
(2000) have noted, even if CBs disclose their internal forecasts to the public in a timely manner, it
is not clear if they would report their true forecasts, or if they adjust them so as to simply follow
the markets. Fourth, it would be interesting to extend the analysis so that current and future
shocks remain private information of the CB.
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pt ¼ kxt þ ut þ bEpt ptþ1
¼ Ept
Xl
k¼0
bk ½kxtþk þ utþk 
¼ Ept
Xl
k¼0
bk ½kð−Acutþk−Bcutþkþ1Þ þ utþk 
¼ Ept
Xl
k¼0
bk ½ð1−kAcÞutþk−kBcutþkþ1
¼ ð1−kAcÞut−kBcEpt utþ1 þ b½ð1−kAcÞEpt utþ1−kBcEpt utþ2 þ N
Since the shocks are white noise, PS inflation expectations when the CB fully discloses ut+1 is
given by
Ept ptþ1 ¼ ð1−kAcÞutþ1
which is the expression following Eq. (23) in the main text. On the other hand, when the CB
withholds information about ut+1, PS expectations depends on the signal, st, about ut+1:
Ept ptþ1 ¼ ð1−kAcÞkst
where 0bkb1 (see Section 3.1 in the main text).
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